Abstract: Java Cards are a new generation of smart cards that use the Java programming language. As smart cards are usually used to supply security to a system, security requirements are very strong and certification can become a competitive advantage. Such a certification to a high Common Criteria or ITSEC level requires the proof of all the security mechanisms. Those security mechanisms include the byte code interpreter and verifier of the virtual machine. Previous works have been done on methodology for proving the soundness of the byte code interpreter and verifier using the B method. It refines an abstract defensive interpreter into a byte code verifier and a byte code interpreter. However, this work had only been tested on a very small subset of the Java Card instruction set. This paper presents a work aiming at verifying the scalability of this previous work. The original instruction subset of about ten instructions has been extended to more than one hundred instructions, and the additional cost of the proof has been managed by modifying the specification in order to group opcodes by properties.
Introduction
A smart card is a small embedded system generally used to supply security to an information system. Traditionally, the application and the operating system were developed in a secure environment by the card issuer. For few years, platforms (e.g., Java Card, MultOS and Smart Card for Windows) have provided new facilities for application developers. They allow dynamic storage and execution of downloaded executable content. Those platforms are based on a virtual machine both for portability across multiple smart card micro-controllers and for security reasons. Such architecture introduces new risks: the most important one is the possibility to attack the card from an applet by exploiting some implementation faults. In order to avoid such a risk, card manufacturers have a fairly extensive qualification process. Quality insurance requirements for smart cards are very strong. To convince the customer that the system is secure enough, card manufacturers propose to evaluate their system through a certification process. This certification is a means for the card issuer to promote its products against its competitors. Sometimes the customer or the targeted market requires the certification.
For example, the German market requires each product that uses an electronic signature to be certified at the E4 level of the ITSEC scheme. According to the certification rule and the requested level, the card issuer must provide all the elements needed by the authority to guarantee the quality of the development process. At some high levels, it is required to use formal methods and to provide the proof that security mechanisms satisfy the security policy. One of the trickiest problems is to prove the coherence of the different security mechanisms of the system. Since there are strong size constraints on the chip, the amount of memory is small. This leads Java Card to modify the security scheme. It becomes more crucial to be able to prove the correctness of the whole system security. After a brief presentation of the Java Card security mechanisms, we sum up the stateof-the art on the formal verification of the Java byte code semantics. We emphasise the proof of the static and dynamic semantics coherence using our approach. Then, we conclude with the extension of our work and its integration in the whole Java Card model.
Security of the Java Card
The Java Card 2.1 standard defines the CAP file (Converted APplet) i.e., the structure of the input files. For each byte code, the standard defines the conditions required for a correct execution, but not the way to ensure that those conditions are met. The Java Card virtual machine is specially designed for smart card; several features have been removed, compared to the Java virtual machine, while others features have been added (e.g., the applet firewall). The Java Card API is a set of tools or services aimed to help programmers designing Java Card applets. Due to the limited resources of the smart card (CPU, memories…), most of the tests (the verifier and part of the loader) must be done statically, outside the card. A secure link mechanism allows the card to check the integrity of the cap file; i.e., after having verified the signature, the card can safely assume that the downloaded program has the required properties, and that a valid verifier has checked it. Of course the certificate can only be provided by a trusted third-party authority. In fact, the security provisions are scattered across different components: a verifier, a converter, an on-card loader, a firewall and an interpreter (see figure 1) . Moreover a specific applet is used to manage the applet: the Java Card Runtime Environment (JCRE). It is used to select and deselect applets, and also contain the registers of the selected applets and of the currently active applet. While the virtual machine insures Java language-level security, the firewall performs additional runtime checks. This mechanism is in charge of the applet isolation and of the control of object accesses. For example, it prevents unauthorized accesses to the fields and the methods of class instances. An applet may share objects with other applets, so the applet firewall must control the access to the shareable interface of these objects. This component is of prime importance for the system security.
Fig.1: Java Card environment
The security policy has to express the correct confinement of the applets and the correct access to shared objects. The respect of the typing rules associated to the access rules of the firewall guarantee this security policy. Thus, we have to verify that the elements performing those checks are correctly implemented and that they are consistent. A formal specification of these mechanisms must be done even if the formal proof is costly. Several elements have already been modelled: the verifier and partially the JCRE with an emphasis on the firewall [Mot-00]. We present here a method guaranteeing that the security policy is correctly implemented by the different mechanisms.
Related Work
There has been much work on a formal treatment of Java but no work has been done in order to formally verify whether a given security policy is correctly implemented by a virtual machine. All the works on Java and the Java byte code focus on a formal definition of the semantics. At the Java language level, and define a formal semantics for a subset of Java in order to prove the soundness of its type system. considers a subset of the byte code and aims at proving the runtime correctness from its static typing. Then, he proposes the proof of a verifier that can be deducted from the virtual machine specification. An interesting work has been done by . He proposes a formal implementation of a defensive virtual machine. It is possible to prove that his model is equivalent to an offensive interpreter plus a sound byte code verifier. propose a verification mechanism based on a model checker. They shown the easiness of the proof process using the SMV tool. Goldberg proposes a formal specification of the byte code verifier for the data flows analysis. His approach is close to the implementation but he simplifies the problem when 
The approach used
The main purpose of our approach is to ensure the soundness of the type system. Principles described in are used to formally specify the Java byte code interpreter. The main idea is to start with a formal description of an abstract defensive byte code interpreter that defines the checks needed to ensure a safe byte code execution. This defensive byte code interpreter defines the expected security policy.
Fig 2: Overview of the approach
The runtime checks performed by the defensive interpreter are removed and converted to static constraints on the byte code during the refinement process. During this process, the proof obligations of the refinement ensure the validity of the static constraints specified.
At the last refinement step, the machine is separated in a byte code verifier, which enforces the static constraints, and an aggressive interpreter, corresponding to the implementation of the Java Card virtual machine. The refinement mechanism ensures that the security policy defined in the abstract interpreter is preserved by the aggressive one. Initially, a small instruction set composed of about ten instructions and a simplified lattice has been used. This approach was adapted to this small instruction set, but extending it to the whole Java Card instruction set did not scale well. More exactly, each instruction needed several manual proofs and both the response time and memory requirement of the prover was too large to completely demonstrate the proofs. The next part focuses on describing how the approach has been extended for a large subset of the Java Card virtual machine.
Machine considered

Instruction set
The Java Card subset considered consists of all the stack manipulation instructions, most of the control flow instructions and instructions manipulating local variables.
As the aim of this work was to verify the scalability of the approach, instructions that would drastically increase the complexity of the model have been left out. Especially, those instructions include the instructions used for subroutines, for method calls and for objects handling. The difficulties implied by those instructions have already been widely studied, and there are known solutions for handling them. Moreover, those difficulties usually involve few instructions, and are not subject to scalability problems. The handling of exceptions and subroutines will be added later, when the scalability of the model will be resolved. We will use a model developed as an extension of based on and very close to . So, the chosen instruction set is neither representative of the full Java Card instruction set nor representative of the tricky parts of the full instruction set. However, it appears as a valid choice to study the problems that can be encountered when extending a ten instructions subset to the full instruction set. A subset of instructions manipulating the stack is created. Each of those instructions is considered as first removing elements from the stack, and adding new elements to the resulting stack. For example, the instruction iadd, which adds the two topmost elements of the stack together, and replaces them by the result, is considered as being an instruction that pops two integers from the stack and pushes an integer. To model this, two constants have been added: tpushed and tpopped. Those constants are defined as partial maps from opcodes to sequence of types. tpopped defines the types that are expected to be removed from the top of the stack, and tpushed defines the types to be pushed onto the stack when the instruction is executed. In the previous example, tpushed(iadd) is equal to the one element sequence [integer] , and tpopped(iadd) is equal to the sequence [integer, integer] . In order to simplify the specification and the proof process, the opcodes are grouped by properties. Sets are defined to contain opcodes with similar properties. For example, the following sets are used:
• OP_NEXT. This set contains opcodes that can go to the next instruction after execution. This include nearly all the instruction, excepted the unconditional jumps.
• OP_BRANCH and OP_BRANCH_W: the set of opcodes that may perform a relative branch, where the target is defined by the first parameter. There are two sets, since the branch can be defined by a signed byte parameter ( OP_BRANCH) or a signed short parameter ( OP_BRANCH_W) • OP_NEXT_FRAME_READ: the set of opcodes reading a value from the local variables. A given opcode can be part of several sets. For example, instructions that perform conditional branch are both elements of OP_NEXT and OP_BRANCH. Although every Java Card opcodes can not fit in a group, such a grouping scheme highly simplifies the specification. One drawback is that grouping opcodes by properties generates more complicated proof obligations that require increased manual interaction. However, those proof obligations are more generic and can usually be used to discharge nearly all the proof obligations corresponding to the opcodes within the group.
State of the machine
We consider the execution of one method. This is enough to verify the consistency between the interpreter and the verifier. Thus the verification can be performed a method at a time, provided that some information about the global context is accessible. A set BYTE is defined, the method being considered as a sequence of BYTE. Since its content does not change during the interpretation, it is defined as a constant. Some additional information on the method is added: max_stack corresponds to the maximum size of the local stack during the execution of the method, and max_local to the maximum number of local variables used. Lastly, the set opcode_locations corresponds to the set of valid adresses within the method. As this last information is not directly available within the classfile, it has to be computed before the method is executed.
Fig 3: Constants used to represent a method
For the most abstract specification, we are only interested in the types contained in the stack and the frame. So, the state consists of: • the program counter, which points to the instruction currently being executed, • the typing of the runtime stack, • the typing of the frame. This state is defined by the variables shown on figure 4. For now, the variable frame_type contains the content of the frame, and is defined as a partial map from integer to type (more exactly, from the interval 0 to the maximum variable number to type). The variable stack_type represents the content of the stack, and is defined as a sequence of types. apc is defined as beeing a value in opcode_locations, always ensuring the applet confinement. An additional invariant ensures that the stack never overflows. Since we manipulate byte, and not more abstract data types, we need some functions converting bytes to opcodes or values. Figure 5 lists some of the B functions defined. The functions BYTE_to_signed and BYTE2_to_signed allow converting a byte or a short into a signed value useable within the specification. Those functions are defined as constants, and are used to get the opcodes and the parameters from the method. 
The defensive interpreter
The defensive interpreter performs an abstract execution of the method, and ensures that every instruction can be executed in a safe way by runtime tests. Each Java opcode has an associated B operation describing the expected semantics. To simplify the specification, a few more definitions have to be introduced (Fig 6) . The first definition corresponds to a function returning the opcode for the specified location in the method. The second one is used to access parameters associated to opcodes. The next one computes the address of the next instruction based on the number of additional parameters of the opcode. The last definition is a predicate ensuring that the stack can be updated according to the definition of the current opcode. That is, it ensures that the execution of the instruction will not introduce stack underflow or overflow, and that the types expected are present on top of the stack.
To specify the operations, we use event driven B, and associate a guard corresponding to the expected opcode of the operation. The operation will be triggered when the guard is true, that is, when the corresponding opcode is encountered. Each operation performs tests ensuring that it can safely be executed and then updates the state of the machine. For example, the specification of the iload instruction, which loads an integer local variable onto the stack is given figure 7.
^(stack_type↓size(tpopped(opcode(apc))))
END END; Fig 7: Specification of the operation corresponding to the iload opcode
In this example, the content of the SELECT clause means that this operation will be triggered when an iload opcode is encountered within the method. Then, the tests within the IF clause correspond to the runtime tests performed when executing the instruction: the two first checks ensure that the local variable exists and is defined, and that the types it uses match with the expected types, ensuring correct typing. The next checks ensure the confinement of the applet execution, by testing if the program counter is still within the method body after the operation is performed. The last check tests for the stack underflow and overflow, and ensures that the types expected within the stack match with the types found. As this defensive interpreter only operates on types, its specification cannot be deterministic: some instruction behaviour may depend on the values stored in the stack or within the variables. An example of this is the instructions performing conditional branch depending on stack values. As only the type of those values is known, it isn't possible to decide if the branch is taken. Instead, it is specified that, either the jump is performed, either the execution continues to the next instruction. The specification of the ifle instruction is given on figure 8. 
^(stack_type↓size(tpopped(opcode(apc))))
END END END; Fig 8:Specification of the operation corresponding to the ifle opcode
The B substitution CHOICE represents a non-deterministic choice. The first part of the clause represents the case where the execution continue to the next instruction, and the second to the case where the execution continue to the branch target. Determinism will be added within the interpreter specification, since the values stored within the stack are not available before.
Replacement of runtime tests by static properties
Introduction of new variables
Replacing the runtime checks by static properties implies adding additional information about the method. Especially, we need to know the typing content of the stack, and the type of the potentially used local variables for each instruction. This information is provided by a type inference performed by the verifier. It is possible to infer this information, because a valid Java program has to be verifiable in a finite time . The verifier would reject any program where this information could not be computed.
Two new variables are introduced (figure 9): stack_type_s and frame_type_s, representing the result of the type inference. For each instruction of the method, they define the expected content of the stack and the frame. These variables are linked to the state of the interpreter, by stating that the current state of the interpreter must match the expected state.
frame_type_s ∈ seq(0..max_locals-1 TYPE) ∧ stack_type_s ∈ seq(seq(TYPE)) ∧ stack_type_s(apc)=stack_type ∧ frame_type_s(apc)=frame_type 
Definition of the static properties
We currently consider three different static properties. These properties correspond to properties on the control flow (applet confinement), on the stack (correct typing and no underflow/overflow), and on the validity of local variables access (correct typing). These static properties are expressed as invariants of the machine, by predicates linking the state of the interpreter before execution of an instruction to its state after execution. The confinement property is expressed by defining properties that must be enforced for opcodes of different groups.
pc+BYTE2_to_signed(method(pc+1),method(pc+2)) ∈ opcode_locations) Fig 10: Static properties for confinement
The stack properties are expressed in a similar way. They relate the content of the static typing stacks before the instruction to the content of those stacks after the instruction is executed. For example, in the case of branching opcode, it is stated that:
• the size of the stack after the execution of the instruction is less than max_stack, • the stack does not underflow during the execution of the instruction,
• the resulting stack does not underflow,
• the static stack for the branch target matches with the resulting stack. The property associated to the stack for branching opcodes are given on figure 11. -size(tpushed(opcode(pc))) ∧ stack_type_s(pc)↑size (tpopped(opcode(pc) 
Fig 11: Stack property for branching opcodes
Note that the inequalities describing the size of the stack are written in such a way that they are suitable to the normalisation used by the prover. Although the specification is less straightforward to read, proving its correctness is far easier. For example, in some cases, the number of commands needed to achieve the proof can be divided by more than two. The last set of properties ensures the consistency of the frame accesses. It uses functions similar to tpopped and tpushed: frame_type_used to get the expected type of the local variable used.
static_frame_checked == ∀pc.((pc∈dom(method) ∧ opcode(pc) ∈ OP_NEXT_FRAME_READ) ⇒
BYTE_to_unsigned(method(pc+1)) ∈ 0..max_locals-1 ∧ frame_type_s(pc)(BYTE_to_unsigned(method(pc+1)))=frame_type_used(opcode( pc))∧ frame_type_s(pc+1+parameters_size(opcode(pc))) ⊆ frame_type_s(pc)) Fig 12: Frame property for opcodes reading the frame
Three boolean variables are defined: flow_checked, stack_checked and frame_checked. Those variables correspond to the result of the verifier, and are set to true only if the program has the corresponding property. Invariants are added to link those values to the static properties defined as shown on figure 13 .
Fig 13: Invariant defining static properties
The specification of the operations is nearly the same as previously. The difference is that tests against the values of the checks variable are placed within the guard, and that the dynamic tests are removed. For example, the specification of the iload operation is given on figure 14 .
opcode(apc))^(stack_type↓size(tpopped(opcode(apc)))) END; Fig 14: Specification of the iload opcode
The refinement mechanism ensures that every refined operation can occur only in a state corresponding to one in which the abstract operation could occur, and that the refined operation behaves as the abstract operation. So, proving that the new specification is a valid refinement of the defensive interpreter ensures the soundness of the byte code verifier and the interpreter. The main difference between the defensive interpreter and the refined interpreter, apart the fact that no runtime tests are performed is that there is not a strict correspondence between the operations triggered by the defensive interpreter and the refined one. If the method can be checked, then the operations triggered will be the same as the abstract ones. However, if the method contain an error, the abstract operations will be called until the program counter reach the error, but no refined operation will be called at all.
Inclusion of the verifier and the interpreter
This refinement is mainly used to include both the verifier and a "real" interpreter. By real, we mean an interpreter that does not perform an abstract interpretation of the method based on the types of the values, but only uses values.
Verifier specification
The verifier specification contains only one operation, which performs the byte code verification, and returns a boolean value corresponding to the result of the verification. The specification of the verify_method corresponding to the previously described properties is given on figure 15 . The implementation of the verifier performs the type inference using a fixpoint computation as described in . The presence of embedded loops increases the difficulty of the proof process. Splitting the implementation in several small operations allows the automatic prover to discharge up to 95% of the proof obligations. However, proving the remaining 5% proof obligations is still costly.
Interpreter specification
The interpreter is defined as a machine similar to the abstract interpreter, excepted that it is an aggressive interpreter, and that it operates on values instead of types. Its state consists of a pointer to the current instruction executed ( dpc, for dynamic program counter), the values stored in the stack ( stack_value) and the values stored in the frame (frame_value).
To ensure the consistency between the abstract interpreter and the concrete interpreter, we have to glue the state of the abstract interpreter to the state of the concrete interpreter using additional invariants. For the stack, it is ensured that both the stack containing the values and the stack containing the types have the same size. That is, every defined value has a type, and every type has a value. The invariant relating the types frame to the values frame is not as simple: it is stated that the domain of the typing frame has to be included within the domain of the value frame.
That is, every variable that may be used is defined. The domain value_frame can be larger than the domain of type_frame, since every local variable has a value even if its type is not defined. Last, the current instruction executed must be the same for both interpreters. Those three invariants, shown on figure 17 ensure that we have not specified two different and unrelated interpreters. apc = dpc ∧ size(stack_type) = size(stack_value) ∧ dom(frame_type) ⊆ dom(frame_value)
Fig 17: Gluing of the interpreter
The guards corresponding to the operations are unchanged. However the body of the operation now only calls the associated operation of the interpreter. For example, figure 18 shows the operation op_iload, that calls the corresponding operation int_iload of the interpreter.
Fig 18: iload operation for the second refinement int_iload is the operation corresponding to the opcode iload within the interpreter machine ( figure 19 ). It pushes the value contained in the specified local variable onto the stack. As this interpreter is implemented in a separate machine that has no knowledge of the constraints enforced on the byte code, the preconditions ensuring that the execution can be performed have to be provided. Preconditions are specification substitutions that specify the conditions that have to be true when the operation is called. They are used to generate proof obligations, and to achieve the proof. The consistency between those preconditions and the byte code verification is ensured by the proof obligations generated when the operation int_iload is called from the operation op_iload: it will be needed to prove that the content of the op_iload guard implies the int_iload precondition. Another point is that, instead of using a different machine, the interpreter could have been treated as a refinement of the abstract defensive machine, in a way similar to what has been done in . However, separating the interpreter from the abstract specification seems to be a better solution, since less proof obligations will be generated: proofs are needed when the interpreter is included within the refinement, but not in later refinements of the interpreter, allowing to focus on the interpreter implementation. Moreover, implementing the interpreter as distinct machines allows to clearly separate the proof of consistency and the implementation.
Proof of the specification
The specification of the defensive virtual machine and its refinement is about 10000 lines of B specification. The Atelier B tool, that we used for this specification generates nearly 3000 proof obligations. It should be noted, however that the proofs are not complicated by themselves. The main difficulty lies in their number: proving the correctness of the specification corresponds to discharge a lot of simple proof obligations. For this specification, the main goal is to limit the cost of the proof process. We focus on obtaining similar proof obligations, so that a single demonstration could be used to demonstrate several similar proof obligations. This is achieved by specifying opcodes properties and constraints in a generic way. This involves grouping opcodes by properties, but also using generic description. For example, using the functions tpushed and tpopped allows specifying nearly all operations that manipulate the stack the same way.
To illustrate the advantages of using generic specification, figure 20 presents two simplified proof obligations, the first corresponding to a specification that does not groups opcodes, and the second to the specification previously described. Discharging the proof obligation without groups is quite straightforward: it involves using hypothesis (1.2) and (1.3) with hypothesis (1.1). However, in the Java Card case, there will be one hypothesis similar to (1.1) by opcode, and the automatic prover will not be able to choose the right one, requiring user interaction. Moreover, as the opcode considered is explicitly used, this interaction will be required for every opcodes. For the complete Java Card interpreter, this means that proving this property for each opcode will need approximately two hundred different, but very similar proofs with user interaction. In the case where groups are used, the hypothesis opcode(apc)∈OP_NEXT (2.5) can be added. This hypothesis is automatically accepted by the prover thanks to ( 2.1) and (2.3), and user interaction will not be needed. The new hypothesis (2.5) can then be used with hypothesis (2.2) to discharge the goal. The important point is that the commands used to demonstrate this goal does not consider the opcode names, and can be directly reused to prove similar proof obligations for opcodes that are elements of the set OP_NEXT. This means that there will be one user interaction for nearly two hundred proof obligations. This is all the more important, since the response times of the interactive prover can be very large for such a specification. However, those gains have to be balanced by the fact that the proof obligations are often more complicated to prove, and the initial proof can take some time to be carried out. Moreover, all the Java Card opcodes can not fit in a group, and some opcodes will still need to be treated as special cases. Another important point with opcode groups is that it also reduces the number of predicates within the invariant. This reduction drastically increases the performance of the tool.
PO without groups
Conclusion
Proving the correctness and the soundness of the type system is a first step to a certification of Java Card. Other parts of the security policy are implemented by different functions such as the firewall, that controls access policies. As one of the common criteria requirements is to guarantee the coherence of all the security mechanisms, it is needed to integrate this model into a more generic model encompassing the whole security policies.
Future works will focus on integrating the firewall specification defined in with the interpreter. Then, the model will be extended in order to model the complete Java Card interpreter. This will allow, not only to prove the soundness of the byte code verifier and of the interpreter, but also will ensure the correctness of their implementation.
